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PRAGMATISM AND IDEALISM. WILLIAM CALDWELL, D.Sc. Adam & Charles Black. 1913. Pp. ix, 268. 6s.

"What is attempted in this book," Professor Caldwell announces in the opening sentence of his preface, "is an examination of the Pragmatist philosophy in its relations to the older and newer tendencies in the thought and practice of mankind." It is inevitable that so comprehensive a programme should remain an attempt rather than become an achievement; an attempt indeed that confounds. The reader gets no clear idea of what the relations said to be examined are, or in what respects pragmatism and idealism resemble each other and differ. Instead, he gets an overwhelming impression that the author has read much and digested little, and that his thinking and reporting are careless and slovenly to an extraordinary degree. In structure the book is not a logically developed exposition of a theme, but a collection of separate essays, the relations of which to each other are uncertain, and one of which—*Pragmatism as Americanism*—seriously violates the unity of the book. In content it is largely an enumeration of proper names, titles, philosophic terms, epithets, and foot-notes, with little or no regard to their explicit significances and no demonstration of their connections with pragmatism; the writer appearing to assume that his *ipse dixit* is sufficient to establish these. Here is a characteristic passage: "The writer finds that he has noticed in this connexion [i.e. the relation of pragmatism to the philosophic tradition] the doctrines of Stoicism and Epicureanism, the 'probability' philosophy of Locke and Butler and Pascal, the ethics and the natural theology of Cicero, the 'voluntarism' of Schopenhauer, Aristotle's philosophy of the Practical Reason, Kant's philosophy of the same, the religious philosophy of theologians like Tertullian, Augustine, Duns Scotus, and so on—to take only a few instances." Only a few, indeed! There is the unmistakable scent of the card-index and library-catalogue about such writing. And this becomes very strong when one regards the style, with its incoherences, its clumsy introductions of new matter with "as for," "as to," "in regard to" (the book bristles with them), and its monotonous use of the epithet "great" for doctrines that are approved and the epithet "mere" for doctrines that are disliked. Manner and matter being inseparable, faulty argument and inaccurate statement are not surprising; the latter often arising from the fact (as in the reference to Poincaré on page 33) that the information offered has not been obtained at first hand.

As an "examination of the pragmatist philosophy" the book turns out to be a bare collocation of what its author considers the

characteristic doctrines of pragmatism's protagonists, with the names and sometimes the opinions of thinkers not pragmatists. In consequence, pragmatism appears to have affiliations of no less than universal scope, so much so that one wonders whether there exist any differentia whatsoever by which pragmatism could be distinguished from other ways of thinking. The fundamental traits which Professor Caldwell assigns to it are four in number: (1) the opinion that all truth is "made" truth; (2) the belief in the prime importance of belief; (3) the anti-rationalist "deeper" view of human nature and volition; (4) an "anti-intellectualism," to which English Hegelians have made many concessions. But these traits, the learned author tells us, pertain to ancient and mediæval and modern philosophies quite as much as to pragmatism, so that they fail in fact to constitute, whether we take them distributively or collectively, a differential criterion whereby the modern way of thinking may be identified. Professor Caldwell is compelled, consequently, to seek such a criterion elsewhere, and it becomes uncertain whether the essence of pragmatism is these traits, or what he calls the pragmatist emphasis of the importance of human action for philosophy; an importance which is emphasized incidentally by Nietzscheans, theosophists, and spiritists also, and which Professor Caldwell himself minimizes completely by his ostensible reinforcement thereof with the consideration that there is "no necessary presumption against the idea of regarding human evolution as at least in some sense a continuation or development of the life that seems to pervade the universe in general" (p. 103). This is minimization; for all monisms and transcendentalisms are concerned to show the essential continuity and identity of human life with the life of the universe "in general." That is their chief stock in trade.

There appears then, although quotation is often so ample as to be confusing, no clear delineation of pragmatism. The criticism of this intellectual movement has the same characteristics. It is vague, ill-informed, and self-contradictory. In summary, Professor Caldwell makes the following points: "that Pragmatism is unsystematic and complex and confusing; that it has no adequate theory of 'reality,' and no unified theory of philosophy; that it has no satisfactory criterion of the 'consequences' by which it proposes to test truth, and that it has not worked out its philosophy of the contribution of the individual with his 'activity' and his 'purposes' to 'reality' generally, and that it is in danger of being a failure in the realm of ethics" (p. 127).

The first accusation is inevitable in a book which affiliates pragmatism with all existing types of philosophy and fails to establish its differential either empirically or deductively. The second accusation turns on the meaning of the word "adequate"; but that there are several pragmatist "theories of reality," all of which have the notion of activity as their fundamental concept, is of course a matter of record. Professor Caldwell appears to disagree with these theories, if indeed he knows what they are (his treatment of James's "radical empiricism," Dewey's immediatism, and Schiller's humanism suggests that he does not); but the grave assumption that a theory is inadequate because Professor Caldwell disagrees with it, requires more evidence than his book supplies. The third count seems to be based on misinformation; for it is a matter of record that pragmatism regards all thinking, philosophical as well as scientific, as a method and process of control. The fourth count, in view of the very explicit statements of James and Schiller and Dewey concerning the criterion of truth, can mean only that these statements do not satisfy Professor Caldwell; but pragmatists have pointed out that satisfaction must be social and involves a "long run." The sixth count shows the author to be either forgetful or ill-informed; as James has discussed the importance of the individual innumerable times, and has devoted a whole book, namely, *A Pluralistic Universe*, to defining its place in "reality generally." Schiller has done the same thing in *Riddles of the Sphinx*, and Dewey and his followers in almost all of their studies. The final count, which, incidentally, ignores altogether James's very important ethical studies in *The Will to Believe*, is specified by the remark that Dewey and Tufts in their ethics fail "to provide a theory of the ordinary distinction between right and wrong" (p. 138). On the other hand, on page 140 it is suggested that they do provide such a theory but that Professor Caldwell does not like it. But it is hardly possible to define failure as doing that which Professor Caldwell does not like. On the whole, the case against pragmatism seems in this book to rest upon the use of such categories as "adequate," "satisfactory," "failure." These are pragmatic categories, and to use them in criticism of pragmatism is simply self-defeating. It is for this reason perhaps that Professor Caldwell finds pragmatism "true in the main" in one place, and incapable of any trueness whatsoever in so many others.

If companionship in discomfort is comforting, pragmatists may take comfort in that the idealism with which pragmatism is compared fares no better than it. There are disparaging references to

various "Anglo-Hegelian" writers, like Bradley; one chapter is devoted to an attack on the first series of Mr. Bernard Bosanquet's recent Gifford Lectures, and another to Bergson, who is called, curiously enough, "the greatest of all the pragmatists." Professor Caldwell appears to like Bergson better than Bosanquet, but believes, of course, that he can be improved upon. Bergson-improved would give rise to the "great" philosophy of the future, "the constructive philosophy, in which we are interested as the outcome of Pragmatism and Idealism." There are indications that such a philosophy may be looked for at the hands of Professor Caldwell.

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HUMAN MOTIVES. JAMES JACKSON PUTNAM, M.D. Little, Brown, & Co. 1915. Pp. xvii, 175.

Dr. Putnam tells us in his preface that the human race is bound by higher obligations and ideals as well as by passions and longings, and that these two sources of human motives necessitate two different modes of approach, the philosophical and the psycho-analytical. He has been for years interested in the Freudian method of psycho-analysis, so that it is to be expected and desired that the greater part of the book should be based principally upon his experiences with this method. A chapter upon The Rational Basis of Religion, however, precedes a description of the Freudian method, and is not the least interesting part of the book. It is pronouncedly idealistic in its philosophy. Love, justice, honor, and power "are just as real as any fact in nature." Free will is defended as well as the self-activity of all reality, the "*elan vitale*" of Bergson.

The chapter entitled "Educational Bearings" is the most practical part of this little book. According to the Freudian theory, many abnormal manifestations are due to suppressions in childhood. The relation of this fact to education is evident. Emphasis must be laid upon motives rather than acts. Care should be taken to prevent suppressions which may become the source of much that is harmful in adult life. A useful warning is given to the effect that both physicians and teachers place too much weight upon their personal influence with their patients and pupils, thus robbing them of the sense of independence. One of the last chapters is upon instinct and ideals.

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